Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Loss Prevention is not Risk Management

I have been giving a lot of thought about how to deal with Risk Management recently. I have talked to a few people and I have come to realize the title of this post. Many of my colleagues only talk about making sure the data doesn't get released, corrupted or unreachable. In my own little head, this to me is loss prevention. Retailers do it all the time, they put those annoying tags on the clothes so that you can try them on properly, to make sure that they don't experience a loss. I'm not saying that the RM and LP are not related, they are. But a loss prevention is the
implementation of controls is not a risk management. I am define risk management as (like Wikipedia):

a structured approach to managing uncertainty related to a threat, a sequence of human activities including: risk assessment, strategies development to manage it, and mitigation of risk using managerial resources.

Most of the time, I have started the risk assessment process with a threat identification, where we list out all the threats. The question is "Do we care?" The answer of course is "No". Stick with me now. Has the person in charge ever turned to you in the beginning of the incident
response ever turned to you and said "I have the Risk Assessment here can you tell me which threat succeeded and which control failed?" Maybe a few but not many, the question that they asked me was, "What failed and (delicately) how do we get the shit back in the horse?" Results not causes. In the heat of the moment, I haven't met anyone that said "I spent three days with a
CVSS calculator determining that the threat is a 2, xxxxxxx turned into a ... ."

You know the next steps, list of threats paired to vulnerabilities, and if you are using the 800-30 then you do the arbitrary but necessary likelihood and impact. To come up with a risk. And there was much rejoicing. Yea! I have checked the proverbial box, submitted my POA&M and now I will retire to the veranda for coffee without a care in the world, right? Wrong.

My perception is that we are working this thing backwards, at least in the Federal government space (which is all I am really familiar with). With the Feds, we know the controls we are going to implement (800-53 or CNSS 1253). And then we know what we don't want to happen, you know ... bad stuff that gets us in the Washington Post or dragged up the Hill.

So let me lay this out, the threats are changing, there are always new vulnerabilities (the only constant is change ), the likelihoods and impacts are subjective so why should we expect anything from that process. Or at best, something we can take action upon.

I have watched many smart people stand up new firewalls, IDPS, NAC solutions, SOCs, AV, whatever and still in the end something gets missed or the human element gets in the way. Because simply implementing and monitoring controls without the understanding of the risks those controls are protecting against is not good. It is just doing Loss Prevention.

2 comments:

alex said...

We are so going to have to hang out sometime. You are exactly where I was (except for the cushy gov't job) about 4 years ago.

Chris said...

What cushy gov't job would that be? Subcontracting to a Federal Agency?